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Chapter 7
Ending Mandatory Retirement in
Two State Universities
Robert M. O’Neil

Elimination of mandatory retirement in some states and institutions began
well in advance of national legislation aﬀecting all higher education. In fact
during the 1980s, I served as president of two major research universities
that were forced by state law to eliminate any mandatory age for faculty retirement. The experiences in the two states (Wisconsin and Virginia) where
I most closely observed ‘‘uncapping’’ were strikingly diﬀerent. Wisconsin
uncapped faculty retirement in 1983 by amending its age discrimination
laws. As a result, the cap was lifted not only for University of Wisconsin
faculty, but also for faculty at Beloit, Lawrence, Marquette, and the state’s
other private institutions (whose administrators were probably unaware of
the change until well after it occurred). Maine and Florida were the only
other states in which such comprehensive uncapping occurred.
On the fateful day that Wisconsin’s legislature addressed this issue, I had
asked for a chance to appear before the relevant state senate committee.
Having been invited—more accurately, permitted, after an urgent plea—to
testify against the proposed uncapping, I was hardly surprised to ﬁnd the
hearing room ﬁlled with senior citizens adamantly opposed to continued
forced retirement. In such a setting, it would have been futile (indeed, counterproductive in terms of other university needs and priorities) to have ﬂatly
opposed a measure that was certain to pass. Instead, the university asked for
two things that were later to be a focus both in Virginia and at the federal
level: time for transition and authority to oﬀer age-based retirement incentives. The Wisconsin lawmakers did give a brief grace period before the law
became eﬀective, but left the university on its own with regard to incentives.
The Virginia experience was diﬀerent in every respect. There was no
chance to testify; uncapping was done quietly in the budget bill; and the university presidents were simply informed as a courtesy on the eve of passage.
The issue there was public employment, so the uncapping spared Wash-
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ington and Lee, Richmond, Hampton, and other private peers. This time
there was no grace period; in fact, the eﬀective date was made retroactive as
an ‘‘emergency’’ bill. University administrators thus faced the very delicate
issue of how to treat senior colleagues who were about to reach 70 and had
completed ﬁling their retirement papers before the enactment but after the
eﬀective date of the uncapping. In one instance the story had a happy ending. One of our most productive scholars—he still is so to this day—asked
to stay and the university was only too delighted to rescind his retirement.
For a few other late sexagenarians whose papers had been processed before
the eﬀective date of the uncapping, there was no such reprieve.
What the Virginia legislature denied in time they more than made up in
authorization of incentives. While the scope of the authority was quite limited—1½ percent of the tenured faculty in any given year—the institutions
were given substantial ﬂexibility in designing plans. The University of Virginia was able to base judgments about eligibility not only on the obvious
factors of age and length of service, but also on an individualized assessment
of relative institutional need by discipline and academic unit. Thus a professor of curriculum and instruction in the Education School might be favored
for incentive retirement over a demographically comparable colleague in a
higher demand ﬁeld such as computer science. Though some initially raised
concerns about the legality of such a subjective element in the equation, it
seems to have stood the test of time and has expanded the utility of an otherwise rather limited incentive program. Any incentive plan that does not take
some account of relative need is likely to overshoot the mark.
The federal experience followed close upon Virginia’s uncapping. National uncapping was legislated in 1986, but it was delayed pending the outcome of a National Research Council (NRC) committee study of which I
was a member. Committee membership had a Noah’s Ark quality—one person from a senior private institution, one from a community college, one
from the health sciences, and a few of us less easily typed. The only standard I could perceive was that each member had to be acceptable to so
many organizations—Association of American Universities (AAU), American Council on Education (ACE), American Association of University Professors (AAUP), American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), and
many others—that only the bland or the omnicompetent could have survived. Yet the group functioned eﬀectively and well, produced a report on
time, said what it needed to say, and dissolved.
Some may still feel the committee was unduly compliant—that it should
have fought for an extension of the cap. The committee proceeded on the
assumption that it did have a choice, whether or not Congress would have
acceded had it reached a diﬀerent conclusion. In the end, the committee
recommended letting the cap expire because we believed that was the right
thing to do. Several factors shaped this conclusion. We were genuinely concerned about prolonging the appearance of special pleading by the profes-
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sorate, at a time when academics could not be said to be universally popular.
We were also persuaded that fears expressed in some quarters about the
impact of uncapping had been exaggerated.
While a few institutions might suﬀer genuine hardship during the period
of transition, the experience of uncapped states—Wisconsin being high on
the list—suggested that most institutions could cope better than the skeptics and doomsayers had warned. In fact, at only one university—Yale—did
more than 75 percent of the tenured faculty remain active until their 70th
year, and thus might be presumed to have been involuntarily retired prior to
the uncapping (National Research Council 1991). Even at such prestigious
places as Michigan and Berkeley these percentages were under 40 percent
(National Research Council 1991). In fact, one oddity in the data was the
striking similarity of actual retirement patterns at comparable institutions
with pension plans as disparate as those at Berkeley (deﬁned beneﬁt) and
Michigan (deﬁned contribution). There seemed to be no principled way in
which to create an exception or dispensation for a small number of private
universities that the NRC committee believed would experience transitional
hardship. Also the committee saw no solid reason why universities and their
tenured professors should not be treated roughly the same as the rest of
society. The group looked closely at data that correlated productivity and
age in academe, and found striking diﬀerences by discipline. People in the
sciences do tend to peak early in publications and discoveries—though it
would be quite unfair to infer that even a physicist is no longer useful after
50. The humanities showed a steady rise in published scholarship, into and
even beyond their 60s, with some striking evidence of late blooming. In the
social sciences, a third and again diﬀerent pattern appeared: a sort of bimodality, with productivity peaking in the late 20s and 30s and reviving again
in the mid- to late 50s, with a slump in early middle age.
In any event, these data suggested the fallacy of the claim that academic
institutions needed to send their elder members out to pasture at a predetermined age. So long as there remained ways in which to address special cases
—including medical disability as a valid basis for terminating even a tenured appointment, which it has always been—the need for a continued cap
simply could not be shown. And while a transitional period might have been
helpful to the few most severely impacted institutions, uncapping would
surely eventually have come to pass. The most the committee could possibly
have done would be to stick a ﬁnger in the dike—a step that seemed unwise
and unwarranted.
There was one other premise to the committee’s conclusion, and here
the group may have been naïve. The committee pleaded for Congress to
grant ﬂexibility in oﬀering age-based retirement incentives. It noted the
precarious uncertainty of the situation with respect to deﬁned contribution
plans—even though deﬁned beneﬁt plans seemed to be exempt from age
discrimination claims for the oﬀering to their faculties of such creative in-

6140 Clark / TO RETIRE OR NOT / sheet 133 of 186
Tseng 2000.8.18 14:02 OCV:0

Ending Mandatory Retirement in Two State Universities

125

ducements. It assumed Congress would view this request as a kind of tradeoﬀ; in eﬀect, the commission could fully support uncapping if—but only
if—it anticipated greater ﬂexibility than a narrow reading of the age discrimination laws then aﬀorded. The subsequent delay in responding to this
request was understandable. Congress took the bait and—for a time—left
higher education in the trap. But as David Raish (this volume) shows, Congress has now acted to make it easier for faculty and administrators in higher
education to design cost-eﬀective retirement incentives.
Another relevant datum here was actual institutional experience. The
longest uncapped senior institution, the University of Florida experienced
no change in the aggregate or average age of retirement. Also there were
two trends among those taking advantage of uncapping: a very small number of people stayed on for a very long time, and a much larger number
stayed for a brief time beyond 70—brief in part because they could then say
they had made a wholly voluntary choice of retirement date, and in part because of the minimum distribution pension requirements which made that
choice less than completely voluntary. Of course, in 1997 Congress changed
the minimum distribution requirements, too, so that those who now choose
to continue working at the same institution are not required to draw down
their retirement savings. To test the possibility that climate and quality of
life might have skewed the sample, it was important to turn again to Wisconsin, where by 1991 uncapping had been around for seven years. Happily, the patterns varied little between Madison and Gainesville; similarities
among the types of faculties seemed to transcend not only geography, but
also dramatic diﬀerences in pension plans. On the basis of such admittedly
incomplete data as these, it appeared that the sky had not yet fallen where
uncapping had been in eﬀect for some time, and that it probably would not
fall elsewhere after uncapping.
Some institutions may well have quite diﬀerent experiences. Some may
also be naïve.
There is a related issue, namely that tenure and retirement are linked.
Tenure will make implementation of uncapping more diﬃcult for some universities. Even here, it is hard to imagine that a responsible institution without tenure (Hampshire, for example) would be completely free of those constraints. Would the presence of tenure create serious enough problems to
justify a continued cap? The NRC Committee, which was composed of administration as well as faculty, was unanimous in its negative response: whatever the complications of tenure, they did not warrant continued mandatory
retirement. That is, the committee believed that tenure was not the cause of
the problem, nor would its curtailment provide a solution. Rather, it recognized the importance of more rigorous standards in the initial granting of
tenure—something we should have been imposing anyway. The committee
also acknowledged the value of periodic review for all faculty, tenured or
not, though it warned against the abuse of such reviews as a subterfuge for
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discrimination on the basis of age or viewpoint. And AAUP standards do not
preclude dismissal of tenure faculty for cause, for proven medical disability,
or on the basis of demonstrated ﬁnancial exigency or the bond ﬁde discontinuance of a program or department for educational reasons. Given those
recognized alternatives and experience, it seemed that institutions would
be able to adapt to the change.
Retirement incentives, valuable though they surely are, should not be
viewed as a panacea, but rather as one element in personnel and policy planning. Lawyers are already likely to share this view. The audience for whom
this caution should be stressed includes personnel directors, human resource experts, and academic administrators of a more general background.
There is a belief that incentives are the cure for whatever problems the ending of mandatory retirement may create. The intervening years have taught
us some of the limitations in that assumption. For one, the people we might
most hope to encourage to retire are, because of their typically modest salaries, least likely to be induced by such an opportunity. They are also least
likely to be able to ﬁnd supplemental or successor employment prospects
to mitigate the loss of income even under a generous incentive program.
The professors who ﬁnd such an option most attractive—indeed, for whom
it may be an oﬀer they can’t refuse—tend to be the most respected of our
colleagues, whom we would least wish to lose.
In this sense, several institutions—perhaps most poignantly the University of California during the ﬁnal voluntary early retirement program
(VERIP) cycles—set out a breakfast for the canary, only to have the cat steal
it and then found themselves without cats enough to combat the next invasion of rats and mice. Such experiences heightened the need for creative
programs that will in eﬀect create separate feeding stations for the canaries,
while the cats keep doing what we want them to do. One attractive approach
is the institutional and unit need that was an important part of the University of Virginia retirement incentive program. That one factor, among several, helped to make the incentive program far more eﬃcient than it would
otherwise have been. The sole negative eﬀect of Virginia’s program was dissatisfaction on the part of a few prospective retirees who were in ‘‘low-need’’
disciplines, and thus could not claim an incentive even though they met the
other criteria and would like to have retired early. But that was a small price
to pay for being largely spared the agonies of wholesale early exodus of the
best and still brightest that many of our sister institutions have encountered.
This is but one possible way of tailoring the program better and more precisely to suite the university’s need and overall personnel goals.

Conclusion
Uncapping has been very much a part of the higher education vocabulary
for at least a decade and a half. Many dreaded it, yet knew it would even-
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tually occur. We have begun to come to terms with it, more easily in some
cases, less easily in others—and with great diﬃculty in certain instances. In
sum, we have sought to do our level best to help mitigate the worst eﬀects of
what is for some institutions a dramatically changed environment. Lessons
from Wisconsin, Virginia, Florida, and other early uncappers have helped
us ﬁnd solutions to these challenges.
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